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SURVEY OF WASHINGTON LAW
ceivably have a deleterious effect upon a smoothly functioning govern-
ment.
4
If the discretionary limitation on governmental liability is to be
retained, as appears likely, some form of test must be established by
which to apply the limitation. In curbing the statutory right of an
individual to redress for governmental torts, equity and justice de-
mand adoption of a rigid test. Indeed, by posing a set of four questions
to be asked in cases involving the discretionary limitation, the court
in the principal case did set forth a test which, if properly applied
in each case, would insure just application of the limitation. 5 How-
ever, the test is cumbersome and, as the holding in the principal case
indicates, easily misapplied. It would seem, therefore, that a simpler
but equally confining test should be substituted for the "four-question
test" in future cases.
Such a test is set forth by Professor Cornelius J. Peck in an article
concerning the discretionary limitation as applied to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.30 Professor Peck suggests that the burden should be on
the state to show affirmatively that the risk to which plaintiff was
subjected was "knowingly, deliberately or necessarily encountered by
one authorized to do so,... in order to achieve the objectives or
purposes" as laid down in the constitution, statute or regulation.37
By adopting this test, the court would preserve necessary governmental
autonomy, free from unpredictable interference by juries. At the
same time, however, the individual claimant would not arbitrarily be
denied recovery because the state would rebuttably be presumed liable.
EQUITY EXCEEDING HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
VALUE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION
An action was brought by the plaintiff widow to permanently enjoin
a judgment creditor from satisfying a judgment on a community debt
from the surplus equity in the homesteaded realty over the homestead
exemption. Plaintiff and her husband, in 1956, filed a valid declaration
of homestead on their residence in Washington, which was held as
"See Fuller & Casner, .1funicipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAgv. L. REV.
437 (1941).
See the questions set forth in note 14 supra.
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of the Discre-
tionary Funwtion Exception, 31 v~rASH. L. REv. 207 (1956). Professor Peck exhaus-
tively treats the discretionary limitation as applied to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1964). See also Note, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 166 (1966).
'7 Peck, supra note 36, at 225-26.
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community property. In 1958, defendants were granted judgment
against the plaintiff and her husband as a marital community. Plain-
tiff's husband died in 1961, and one of the defendants was appointed
administratrix of his estate in Washington. A writ of execution was
issued on defendant's judgment, and the sheriff levied on the home-
stead property in 1962. The superior court subsequently entered a
probate order adjudging that the title of the residence on which the
homestead was filed had vested in the plaintiff as her separate property
immediately upon the death of her husband. The property was
stricken from the inventory of his estate, and the sheriff was perma-
nently enjoined from selling the property. On appeal, the court
reversed and remanded.' Held: Equity exceeding the homestead
exemption in homesteaded realty transferred to a surviving spouse is
subject to execution for judgment on a community debt, despite the
absence of a judgment lien and execution prior to the first spouse's
death, if the judgment is properly presented as a claim against dece-
dent's estate. Aronson v. Murk, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 406 P.2d 607
(1965).
The homestead exemption statutes are bases on article XIX, section
1 of the Washington State Constitution. When a declaration of home-
stead is filed for record,2 the premises described constitute a homestead.3
If the selection was made by a married person from community prop-
erty, the land, on the death of either spouse, vests by virtue of statute
' The principal case was remanded to the trial court for determination of whether
the judgment creditor's claim had been presented in the probate proceeding during
the statutory six month period, or whether it was barred for failure to so present
the claim. WASHa. REv. CODE § 11.40.010 (1956). The court remanded the case because
it concluded that the principal case was not an instance where the burden of proof
required only one party to prove the status of the claim, rather the status of the
claim was equally a part of the case of both parties. Previously the Washington
court has held that the required claim presentation is mandatory and cannot be
waived. See WAsH. REV. CODE § 11.40.080 (1956) ; Walters v. Christensen, 191 Wash.
602, 71 P.2d 664 (1937). And the court has stated that presentation of a claim is a
condition precedent to action on a claim. Empson v. Fortune, 102 Wash. 16, 172
Pac. 873 (1918). From these statutes and cases it appears that the party asserting
the claim has the burden of proof. In light of this conclusion, a question is raised
as to the meaning of the courfs language in the principal case. It is possible that
the court is stating that there is a "mutual" burden of proof; however, it seems
unlikely that such a major change would be presented in this fashion. A more
plausible explanation is that because of the special circumstances, where the
"defendant" was both a judgment creditor and the administratrix, the status of the
claim was essential to both parties. The judgment creditor was required to prove
her claim presentation before recovery. And the plaintiff, who was seeking to have
the administratrix prevented from paying the claim, would have to prove that the
claim was improper.
2 The manner of selection and declaration of homestead are provided in WAsH. REV.
CODE § 6.12.040 (1956).
'What constitutes a homestead is set out in WAsH. RFv. CODE § 6.12.010 (1956).
The value of the homestead is limited to six thousand dollars by § 6.12.050.
[ OL. 41 :517
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in the survivor "subject to no other liability than such as exists or has
been created under the provisions of this chapter."4 By statute, the
homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satisfaction of judg-
ments obtained on debts secured by mechanic's, laborer's, material-
men's, or vendor's liens on the premises, and on debts secured by
mortgages on the homesteaded premises if executed and acknowledged
by both husband and wife.5 When, for the enforcement of a judgment
obtained in a situation other than those enumerated above, execution
is levied upon the homestead, the judgment creditor may apply to the
superior court of the county in which the homestead is situated for an
appraisal.' If it appears to the court from the appraisal that the land
claimed can be divided without material injury, the court must order
the appraisers to set off so much of the land as will equal in value the
homestead exemption, and execution may be enforced against the
remainder.7 If the land claimed as homestead exceeds in value the
amount of the homestead exemption, and the land cannot be divided,
the court must order its sale under the execution.8 In deciding home-
stead questions, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the
homestead statutes are favored in the law and should be liberally con-
strued.9 It has further stated that the statutes do not protect the rights
of creditors; rather, they are in derogation of such rights.'0
The question in the principal case was whether the declared home-
stead was subject only to those liabilities specifically enumerated in
Washington Revised Code section 6.12.100, or whether it was also
subject to the appraisal procedure of section 6.12.140. The question
arose because of the ambiguous use of the word "homestead" in the
statutes, both to refer to the exemption value in the former section and
to the parcel of land in the latter section. The court determined that
the homestead property received by the surviving spouse was subject
to claims made under both sections 6.12.100 and 6.12.140. The court
reasoned that the appraisal procedure referred to the levying of execu-
tion against the surplus equity over and above the exemption value in
the recorded property, and that the enumerated liens referred to the
claims which, because of their nature, may be made against the exemp-
tion value itself. The court concluded that the legislature did not
'WASH. REv. CODE § 6.12.080 (1956).
'WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.100 (1956).
'WASH. Rxv. CODE§ 6.12.140 (1956).
rNXsA. REv. CODE § 6.12.220 (1956).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 6.12.230 (1956).
'Lien v. Hoffman, 49 Vr 2d 642, 649, 306 P2d 240,244 (1957).
" First National Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wn. 2d 193, 202, 242 P.2d 169, 173 (1952).
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intend to give the surviving spouse a homestead subject only to claims
under section 6.12.100, because this would remove all exemption limits
from community property homesteads, no matter how great the value
of the homestead, following the death of one spouse.
The court decided that it was immaterial that the judgment in the
principal case did not become a lien against either the homestead
exemption or the surplus value over and above the exemption." The
court concluded that the excess value could be reached if the property
had remained in the hands of the judgment debtor. 2 Consequently,
the court reasoned that, when the property remained in the hands of
persons protected by the homestead exemption statute, the rule should
be the same as that applied to execution against the judgment debtor
himself, because the mutual rights which were received under Wash-
ington Revised Code section 6.12.080 were intended by the legislature
to be subject to the mutual claims. Thus, the court stated that a lien
was necessary for execution under section 6.12.140 only when there
was no personal liability.'3
The court reasoned that it was also immaterial that the homesteaded
property was not part of the deceased husband's probate estate. The
court concluded that the probate decree was not determinative of
whether the surplus value above the homestead exemption was subject
to execution for a community debt under Washington Revised Code
section 6.12.140. Rather, the probate decree determined only that
'Ordinarily, a money judgment becomes a lien upon real property of a judgment
debtor from the day judgment is rendered. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.190.-200 (1956).
However, the Washington court in Lien v. Hoffman, 49 Wn. 2d 642, 306 P.2d 240
(1957), stated that, when the homestead exemption is established prior to judgment,
as in the principal case, the judgment does not become a lien upon the homesteaded
property except in those situations specified in WASH. REv. CODE § 6.12.100 (1956).
See Barouh v. Israel, 46 Wn. 2d 327, 281 P.2d 238 (1955) ; Trader's Nat'l Bank v.
Schorr, 20 Wash. 1, 54 Pac. 543 (1898). When judgment is rendered prior to the
filing of a homestead declaration, the judgment immediately becomes a lien upon the
real property of the judgment debtor. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.190 (1956). The
Washington court, however, has enjoined the sale of homesteads under the general
execution statutes when a declaration of homestead was filed before the sale.
Security Nat'l Bank v. Mason, 117 Wash. 95, 200 Pac. 1097 (1921); Kenyon v.
Erskine, 69 Wash. 110, 124 Pac. 392 (1912) ; Snelling v. Butler, 66 Wash. 165, 119
Pac. 3 (1911). See Locke v. Collins, 42 Wn. 2d 532, 256 P.2d 832 (1953).
" While the property was in the judgment debtor's hands, the excess value could
have been reached through the process set out in WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.140 (1956),
even though no judgment lien had attached. The court in the principal case
distinguished Trader's Nat'l Bank v. Schorr, 20 Wash. 1, 54 Pac. 543 (1898), in
which the judgment creditor was not allowed to execute on the surplus value, because,
in that case, the property had passed to a bona fide purchaser.
"' The court in the principal case distinguished Locke v. Collins, 42 Wn. 2d 532,
256 P.2d 832 (1953), in which a lien was required for execution, because there was
a discharge in bankruptcy in that case, and, therefore, execution could not have
been made under WAsHa. REv. CODE § 6.12.140 (1956) due to the absence of personal
liability.
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the community property in the probate estate did not include the
homesteaded real estate. Noting that there was no showing that the
marital community had been discharged from the debt, and since no
judgment lien and no execution was issued prior to the husband's
death, the court stated that the judgment creditor was required by
Washington Revised Code section 11.40.130 to file his judgment
against the estate of the deceased like any other claim. 4 If the claim
was timely, the judgment creditor could execute on the surplus; if not,
the action was barred."
The decision reached by the court in the principal case is both
intrinsically sound and in accord with apparent legislative intent.
Taken literally, however, the court's language would produce a strange
result. The court stated that, because of the probate decree, the home-
steaded real estate was not part of the husband's probate estate. The
court concluded, however, that, before recovery was possible, the
judgment creditor must file a timely claim against decedent's estate. A
logical explanation for this seeming inconsistency is that property of
a value equal to the homestead exemption should be excluded from the
probate estate. This "property" passes under the statute to the sur-
viving spouse, subject only to the claims enumerated in Washington
Revised Code section 6.12.100. The surplus value of the homesteaded
real estate over the exemption amount should be treated as being in-
cluded in the probate estate, and subject to claims under section
6.12.140. This analysis would produce the result achieved by the
court in the principal case, and, hopefully, would clarify the inconsis-
tent language.' 6
Had the principal case been brought after July 1, 1967, it would
have been possible for the plaintiff to seek an additional exemption
amount.'" The 1965 Probate Code had increased the value of the
" Usually, a judgment creditor does not have to bring a claim against the
estate; he can go against the real property upon which he has a lien, which can be
sold independently of administration of the estate. See In re Hacketts' Estates, 120
Wash. 236, 207 Pac. 11 (1922). In the principal case, however, it was determined
that the judgment creditor did not have a lien on the real property; consequently, thejudgment creditor was required to bring his claim against the estate.
"5 See note 1 supra.
"Under this analysis it would be necessary for the judgment creditor to invoke
the appraisal procedure of WAsH. REv. CODE § 6.12.140 (1956). Failure to bring
such proceeding would conclusively establish the value of the land as declared. See
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 174 Wash. 185, 24 P2d 420, 27 P.2d
1118 (1933). In addition, the judgment creditor would have to file his claim against
the estate within six months or be barred by WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.40.010 (1956).
"NVASI. REV. CODE § 11.99.010 (1965) provides that the title will become
effective July 1, 1967. But see WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.99.010, .020 (1965).
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award in lieu of homestead to ten thousand dollars.' s Although the
value of the homestead exemption has not, as yet, been changed, and
remains six thousand dollars, 9 there is a provision in the new probate
code that, if the value of the homestead is less than ten thousand
dollars, the court shall award additional property so that the total
shall equal ten thousand dollars.2" Thus, in situations similar to the
principal case, the fact that the homestead value is lower than the
award in lieu of homestead would not be significant because of the
award in addition to homestead. There is, however, no reason for the
variance, and the legislature should act to equalize the values.
EFFECT OF CONFLICTING "OTHER
INSURANCE" CLAUSES
Plaintiff was seriously injured when an automobile in which she
was a passenger collided with another vehicle driven by an uninsured
operator. Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy, issued by defendant,
included coverage for bodily injury caused by uninsured motorists.
Excluded from this coverage, however, was injury sustained in an
automobile not owned by plaintiff, if the owner had "similar insurance"
which was available to plaintiff.' The owner of the automobile in
which plaintiff was injured also carried insurance containing uninsured
motorist coverage. His policy, written by another company, contained
a pro rata clause restricting coverage to a proportionate share of the
loss if the insured had other similar insurance available.2 Being an
"insured" by definition, plaintiff received the maximum payment under
the latter policy, but defendant denied liability because of its policy's
"WASH. IEv. CODE § 11.52.010 (1965).
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.050 (1956).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 11.52.022 (1965).
'The exclusionary, or "escape" clause, read as follows, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 858,
405 P.2d at 713:
This Section of the Policy does not apply: 1. to bodily injury of an insured
sustained while in or upon, entering into or alighting from, any automobile, if
the owner has insurance similar to that afforded by this Section and such in-
surance is available to the insured....
'This pro rata clause read as follows, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 858-59, 405 P.2d at 713:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance, and the Company shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss to which this Uninsured Motorists Coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
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